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　For the past several decades, the number of foreigners in Japan has steadily 
increased. Whereas in the past, the foreign presence in Japan has been easily relegated 
to abstract conceptual and physical margins within Japanese society, this article 
explains why this abstracting of foreign Otherness is becoming increasingly difficult to 
achieve. To make these points, this work refers to the fact that Japan is receiving more 
immigrants from increasingly diverse backgrounds, as well as the increasing prevalence 
of international marriages and biracial people.
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Ⅰ	 I n t r o d u c t i o n
 Anyone familiar with Japan knows that the nation 
is in a dramatic state of change. The demographic 
problems of earlier decades are showing their effects 
in more areas of everyday life and the Japanese 
government has yet to provide a clear direction 
as to how the nation will cope with these changes. 
Thus far, foreign workers have provided one of the 
most viable solutions to deal with the ongoing labor 
shortages brought on by these demographic troubles. 
Although official rhetoric suggests Japan is not a 
country of migration, and that it does not accept 
low-skilled labor, statistics and personal experiences 
tell a different story. Quantitatively, the number of 
foreigners living in Japan has risen steadily for the 
past several decades and shows no signs of slowing. 
Qualitatively, it is virtually impossible to spend 
time in a major Japanese city before encountering 
foreigners working at convenience stores, serving 
food, or checking guests into hotels. The wheels of 
change are turning and while the outcome is unclear, 
we can postulate some tangible directions as to how 
Japanese society will deal with this fundamentally 
different diversification.
 John Lie questions how, despite Tokyo’s diversity, 
the city was able to remain “devoid of visible racial 
or religious contention” for a long time (Lie 2008a, 
162). One answer Lie offers is that foreigners are 
framed as ethnic and cultural Others, and that their 
class differences essentially remain “invisible,” which 
allows for ideas to persist that Japan is homogenous 
and absent of diversity. Elsewhere, researchers have 
noted that Japan, despite being more structurally 
racist than most western societies, is nonetheless 
absent of ethnic and racial tensions that have been 
observed elsewhere (Shipper 2008; Weiner 1998). The 
problems that often accompany diversity have been 
downplayed in favor of ideas about a more egalitarian 
Japan. This is especially true in the case of foreigners, 
who exist at Japan’s far margins. By remaining in an 
“invisible” space, foreigners and the issues regarding 
their presence are easily overlooked and ignored. 
Unquestioned social and identity discourses continue 
uninterrupted and life goes on. 
 This invisibility is both conceptual and material. 
Conceptually, foreigners have been abstracted into 
particular sectors of Japanese life. It was easily 
reasoned that foreigners were not a nationwide 
concern, but rather one that only existed in factories 
of Aichi, the red-light districts of Tokyo, in schools as 
assistant language teachers, or in similarly marginal 
places. This “out of sight, out of mind” mentality was 
easily buttressed by the fact that for a considerable 
amount of time, there was very limited contact 
between Japanese and foreigners, and the contacts 
that did occur were similarly constrained. Now, 
however, both forms of invisibility—the material and 
the conceptual—are changing. The outcomes will 
have important sociocultural implications, which have 
yet to be fully considered or explored.
 This article examines the implications of this 
increased visibility of foreigners and considers how 
Japan’s relationship with migration differs today 
compared with the past. This article explains two 
ways that the conditions surrounding foreigners in 
Japan differ today: (1) increasing diversity and (2) 
increasing prevalence of international marriages and 
biracial people. It suggests that there are fundamental 
differences between the nature of diversity today 
compared with the onset of this migration several 
decades prior, which are compelling changes to the 
relationships that develop between Japanese and 
foreigners in Japanese society, as well as the way 
Japan engages with and conceptualizes cultural 
difference. These particularities make foreigners less 
invisible within Japan and thus are forcing more 
Japanese to reconcile their existence. 


























	 Japan  
 To understand the differences in migration, then 
and now, it is helpful to explain how migration into 
Japan has changed over time. While there has been 
a foreign presence in Japan for centuries, this paper 
is concerned with migrations from the 1980s. This 
is because the 1980s brought the most dramatic and 
most diverse influx of foreigners in modern times. 
During Japan’s colonial empire, there were large 
movements of people between Japan and its colonies, 
which at its heyday consisted of Korea, Taiwan, 
mainland China, and parts of Micronesia (Morris-
Suzuki 1998). Some of these colonized peoples were 
brought forcibly, while others migrated voluntarily 
seeking economic opportunities. The result was that 
large communities of Chinese and Koreans formed 
within the Japanese archipelago. After World War 
II, these populations lost their status as members of 
the Japanese empire (albeit marginalized members) 
and thousands remained stateless in Japan until 
normalization treaties were enacted decades later (Lie 
2008b; Ryang 2000). These communities are today 
referred to as zainichi communities and, while still 
subject to systematic discrimination, have largely 
assimilated linguistically and culturally into Japanese 
society. 
 More recent migration occurred in the 1970s and 
1980s when Japan’s labor shortages began to intensify 
as the nation’s domestic supply of labor diminished 
(Douglas and Roberts 2000). After the arrival of 
several thousand refugees fleeing conflicts in 
Southeast Asia in the 1970s (Kawakami 2003), greater 
numbers of foreigners began arriving in Japan from 
more diverse origins in the 1980s, mostly from other 
parts of Asia. Incentivized by the availability of work 
and the strength of the Japanese Yen, these migrants 
found work in diverse sectors of Japan’s labor 
market. Most found work in jobs that were socially 
stigmatized and that were being neglected by an 
increasingly educated Japanese population, such as in 
construction work and factory jobs.
 This migration resulted in the emergence of 
conspicuous foreign communities that hailed from 
diverse backgrounds and attracted the attention of 
wider society. Whereas issues concerning zainichi 
communities decades earlier were easily overlooked, 
due in part to many ethnic Chinese and Koreans 
“passing” as Japanese, this recent migration was 
harder to neglect. This created an increased 
awareness of foreigners in general because this 
migration occurred so quickly and in such large 
numbers. Some foreign populations were noticeable 
because of the ways they established networks and 
socialized. For example, Iranians used Tokyo parks as 
places to socialize and network with each other. The 
presence of hundreds of Iranians gathering in public 
spaces, seemingly overnight, coupled with a growing 
presence of migration elsewhere generated concerns 
about the threats these foreigners would pose to 
public safety and cultural institutions (Friman 2001; 
Morita 2003; Sakurai 2003). Public commentators and 
government officials started to link the presence of 
foreigners to crime and debates ensued surrounding 
how Japan should best cope with the growing 
presence of these ethnically and culturally different 
foreigners (Friman 2001; Shipper 2008).
 In 1990, “a backlash against the growing number 
of racially distinct, and therefore highlight visible, 
illegal foreign workers prompted a national debate 
over immigration” (Friman 2001, 323). Resultingly, 
Japan revised its immigration policy to privilege the 
entry of ethnic Japanese persons living overseas 
(nikkeijin). This resulted in a decrease in the number 
of foreigners from Asia and an increase in nikkeijin , 
who largely came from Brazil and Peru. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, thousands 
of Japanese migrated to the Americas seeking 
economic opportunity, and these revised migration 
policies aimed to bring these people back to Japan 






foreigners arriving from other parts of Asia and a 
rapid increase in arrivals from Latin America, mostly 
from Brazil and Peru (where most Japanese migrated 
to earlier in the century). 
 This is a classic example of how ideas about 
identity are superimposed upon ethnic and racial 
categories in Japan. It was believed that because 
the nikkeijin  were culturally Japanese, they would 
smoothly integrate into Japanese society, although 
that proved not to be the case (Roth 2002; Tsuda 
2003). Despite the presumption of shared cultural 
and ethnic congruity, it was soon realized that the 
nikkeijin would not smoothly and unproblematically 
integrate into Japan’s society and labor force 
as hoped. Many nikkeijin  were unfamiliar with 
contemporary Japanese cultural norms and work 
habits, many did not speak Japanese competently, 
and many non-nikkeijin  migrated to Japan as well, 
undermining the premise of these policies. In total, 
over 200,000 nikkeijin  migrated to Japan during 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Yamanaka 1996). Due 
to the failure of the nikkeijin  to integrate, the visa 
program that facilitated their entry into Japan was 
discontinued in the early 2000s, which once again led 
to a rebalancing of the foreign population, through 
which the number of South Americans decreased, 
and the number of Asian migrants increased. This is 
largely the situation in which Japan finds itself today. 
 While the number of Brazilian and Peruvians in 
Japan peaked in the early 2000s, foreigners continued 
entering Japan from other countries. Not only did 
migration persist, the Japanese government even 
adopted policies to incentivize migrants to Japan. 
Furthermore, many of the foreigners who migrated 
during the 1980s have established themselves in Japan 
by starting businesses, families, and integrating into 
society as best as they possibly could. These decades 
of migration have fostered the situation today, which 
consists of well-established and growing foreign 
communities from diverse backgrounds. The growth 
and further diversification of these communities 
will likely persist, as Japan has become reliant upon 
foreign workers as a source of low-wage labor. The 
effects of this migration are further intensified by the 
fact that, as the foreign population in Japan increases, 
the Japanese population is concomitantly decreasing. 
While foreigners currently comprise around 2% of 
Japan’s population, demographic trends suggest 
that this figure will rise to 8-27% by 2050 (Willis and 
Murphy-Shigematsu 2008). Such a drastic increase, 
even in its most conservative form, would carry 
significant implications for Japanese society and 
Japan’s sociocultural institutions.
 Taking this ongoing diversification as a starting 
point, this paper explains two ways that these 
contemporary migration patterns differ from the 
past and explains what implications they carry 
for Japanese society. While the following section 
discusses two important ways this migration is 
different, there are, in fact, many forces at work 
that contribute to the novel context within which 
foreigners and Japanese engage one another. What 
effects these new encounters remains to be seen, 
but these conditions warrant serious attention, as 
the changes they might induce are substantial and 
will greatly impact Japanese-foreign relations and 
the ways that Japanese society engages with foreign 
difference.
Ⅲ C o n t e m p o r a r y  
  M i g r a t i o n
 This section discusses two ways immigration 
today differs from the past: (1) the increased volume 
and general diversification of foreigners and (2) 
the persistence of international marriages and the 
increasing number of biracial children in Japan. Each 
difference brings a unique dimension to the ways 
that Japanese-foreigner relations are developing and 
together these differences raise novel questions about 
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 The first way contemporary immigration to Japan 
differs compared to decades earlier is that the foreign 
community in Japan is now considerably larger 
and more diverse. This increasing prevalence and 
diversity means that Japanese people are coming 
into contact with foreigners in more multifaceted and 
dynamic ways. According to the most recent data, 
there are 2,829,416 registered foreigners in Japan 
(Japanese Cabinet Office 2019). A few exceptional 
years notwithstanding, Japan has experienced a 
persistent increase in the number of foreigners 
residing in Japan since the 1990s. 
 Japan’s foreign population has also become 
considerably more diverse. In 1980, there were 
782,910 “registered aliens” in Japan, of which 85% 
were Korean. Most of these were actually zainichi 
Koreans who never naturalized and retained Korean 
nationality, though were by and large assimilated 
into Japanese society. This means that zainichi 
Koreans included, foreigners comprised slightly less 
than 0.6% of Japan’s population (Migration Policy 
Institute, 2017). Five years later, in 1985, there 
were seven countries from which there were 5,000 
registered residents in Japan. Today, there are 
more than thirty-three countries with 5,000 or more 
registered residents (Japanese Cabinet Office 2019). 
This data does not include people who have obtained 
Japanese citizenship or who are working in Japan 
undocumented. This suggests that a significant 
diversification has occurred and that foreigners 
have been coming to Japan from more places and in 
greater numbers than previously recorded. 
 These foreigners have formed communities with 
co-nationals and have played an important role 
in shaping the sociocultural landscape in various 
places throughout Japan. There is now a vast array 
of restaurants serving foreign food and stores 
catering specifically to different foreign populations. 
Such establishments are often run by foreigners 
themselves. Tokyo especially offers a diverse 
assortment of international dining options by native 
chefs, which is a testament to this diversification.
 This ethnic and cultural diversification has 
also been induced in part by the diversification of 
Japanese higher education. Japanese universities 
have expanded the number of degree programs 
offered in English at both undergraduate and 
graduate levels, which has resulted in an increasing 
number of foreign students studying in Japanese 
universities. Furthermore, the Japanese government 
has implemented policies to attract foreign students 
to study at Japanese universities, including the 
Global 30 initiative and the “300,000 International 
Students Plan” (Bushnell 2013; Milly 2018). Many 
universities offer degree programs in English, as well 
as scholarships to students hoping to enroll in these 
programs. Ultimately, these initiatives, coupled with 
a growing interest in university students looking to 
Japan as an attractive destination, have resulted in 
an increasing number of foreign students obtaining 
undergraduate and graduate degrees in Japan. This 
situation is noticeably different from the 1980s when 
foreigners were coming to Japan from more limited 
backgrounds to engage in a limited number of jobs. 
 This diversification has led to novel interactions 
taking place between foreigners and Japanese people, 
which are important for the ways perceptions of 
foreigners develop. New patterns of communication 
and direct interpersonal interaction facilitate new 
forms of sociality that affect wider patterns of 
Japanese-foreign relations. Several recent studies 
show how foreigners and their Japanese counterparts 
reformulate relationships in juxtaposition to one 
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explains how Filipina women married to Japanese 
men in rural Nagano came to be reconceptualized 
by Japanese locals as ii oyomesan (good wives). This 
is because they took up local gender norms that 
Japanese women—who had since moved to urban 
areas—were expected to adopt. Beata Świtek (2016) 
notes the ways that Japanese patients and coworkers 
reconfigure their perceptions of Indonesian care 
workers as a result of their direct encounters 
with them in care settings. Paul Capobianco (2017) 
shows how Japanese families reformulated their 
relationships with Africans of various backgrounds 
through their personal contact via home stays, host 
families, and marriage. Further evidence of the 
changing attitudes Japanese hold towards foreigners 
is articulated by David Green and Yoshiko Kadoya 
(2015), who describe that many factors lead Japanese 
actors to conceptualize foreigners differently, among 
the most important of which are language skills and 
direct contact. 
 Christopher Burgess (2008) provides an example 
of how Korean wives married to Japanese men in 
rural Yamagata led local residents to change their 
perception of foreigners. His ethnography has shown 
how direct encounters between Korean wives and 
Japanese locals fostered conditions through which the 
two parties established better relationships. Rather 
than resisting negative sentiments, the Korean 
women tried to educate locals about their experiences 
in Japan and develop positive relationships based 
on a sense of mutual understanding. Burgess notes 
that this can succeed, and more positive relations 
ultimately might ensue.
 The author of this paper has conducted interviews 
with several foreigners living and working in areas 
with small foreign populations. One African man 
who owns a shop in a small city in northern Japan 
explains that he actively sought a location where he 
could escape the pressures and negative influences 
of Tokyo. Although he still travels to the Kanto area 
regularly, he said that he wanted to relocate his 
family for lifestyle reasons and to escape the bustle 
and influences that surround city life. He also notes 
that he thinks his venture to this area led many of 
the locals to “see a black man for the first time.” He 
stated that the “[locals] were shocked at first, but 
after a while, they got used to having me here. Young 
people like my shop and I am an active member of 
the community. I speak Japanese and go to events 
and stuff. So, I think we’re all good.” In another case, 
a Filipina woman living in Shikoku explains that she 
moved to the island to follow her boyfriend who was 
transferred and never left because they enjoy the 
lifestyle. She notes that many other Filipina women 
had come to the same area for lifestyle reasons. 
 As for the diversification of higher education, the 
increasingly diverse backgrounds of foreign students 
allow Japanese students to mingle with and befriend 
foreigners from ethnic and national backgrounds 
that they otherwise would not engage with. While 
the effects of these interactions need to be further 
examined, it is not farfetched to surmise that these 
cross-cultural friendships will spark the interest of 
some young Japanese people, which allows them to 
develop more amicable attitudes towards diversity 
and a sincerer interest in foreign cultures. 
 Previous research and these larger trends suggest 
that there are qualitatively novel engagements 
happening between foreigners and Japanese people 
(Capobianco 2017; Faier 2009; Świtek 2016). These 
encounters are having variegated outcomes and 
have the potential to cause Japanese people to 
reconceptualize foreign difference in a multitude of 
ways. No longer are simplistic associations of cultural 
Others as being staunchly and unambiguously 
negative accurate for comprehending what is 
occurring in Japanese society today. Instead, more 
careful and more dynamic consideration of the 
different ways foreigners and Japanese engage one 
another, as well as who is engaging one another, are 
necessary for furthering our understandings of the 
impacts that immigration is having on Japan.
 This diversification is also causing the Japanese 
government to react and respond to the needs of 
these foreigners, albeit nominally. For example, 
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services to better accommodate foreigners from 
diverse backgrounds, though the reach of these 
services remains limited. An increasing number 
of signs and official documents are offered now in 
English, Chinese, Vietnamese, and other languages. 
However, since such resources are limited, foreigners 
are also subject to numerous other difficulties. 
Workers are often unaware of their rights and many 
have been brought to Japan by employers under 
false pretenses, which pay do not pay them the legal 
minimum wage or offer other benefits employers 
should otherwise provide (Douglas and Roberts 2000; 
Shipper 2008). The government’s trainee program 
has been a prime example of this, where low-wage 
workers are imported under the guise that they are 
undergoing professional “training,” but are in fact 
engaging in low-wage work. This program has been 
riddled with problems and has come under significant 
scrutiny from activists, though there seems to have 
been little serious effort to alleviate these problems 
(Bélanger, et al. 2011).
 Such conditions are notably different than in 
previous decades, where the number of foreign 
residents in Japan was smaller (both in sum and 
as a percentage of the total population) and where 
engagements with foreigners were limited to 
particular workplaces and geographic contexts. Such 
novel conditions are already facilitating new forms 
of sociality and personal relationships to develop, 
through which more dynamic understandings of 
foreign and cultural difference are developing in the 
minds of Japanese actors. How this will ultimately 
unfold long-term remains to be seen. However, it is 
not unlikely that more dynamic views will develop 
as more Japanese cross paths with foreigners in 
heretofore never experienced ways, and as Japanese 
and foreigners renegotiate their relationships to 
one another in this volatile and uncertain climate. 
Understanding these views can help us to better 
understand the ways that Japan is changing as a 
result of immigration and what the trajectory of 
Japan may entail henceforth.
2．International Families 
   and Their Influence on 
   Society  
 Another area in which migration and diversity 
conditions differ today compared with the past is 
in terms of mixed families. International marriages 
(kokusai kekkon) continue to occur and biracial people 
are becoming increasingly visible within Japanese 
society. The perseverance of international marriages 
over the past three decades has created a landscape 
that continues to expose increasing numbers of 
Japanese people to foreigners and their experiences. 
Relatedly, these marriages are producing offspring 
that are of mixed background (konketsuji ), thus 
effectively raising the number of biracial people in 
Japan. While this is significant in itself, these changes 
have been compounded by the fact that a number of 
biracial celebrities have generated public attention 
and controversy over the past several years. The 
novel phenomenon here is the increased number 
of biracial people and the increasing attention they 
are receiving. The scale of these phenomena plus 
the attention generated towards and about differ 
considerably in historic context.
 Although the number of international marriages 
in Japan peaked in 2006, there are still over 20,000 
international marriages in Japan each year, meaning 
that roughly one in every twenty-nine marriages is 
an “international marriage” (Amano 2017; Ministry of 
Health, Labor, and Welfare 2017). The commonality of 
international marriages carries important implications 
for the ways Japanese and foreigners engage one 
another and how these parties establish new forms of 
sociality in this context.
 These international marriages, and the family 
and personal connections they carry with them, are 
accompanied by an increased awareness of issues 
related to foreigners, what problems foreigners 
face, and how foreigners interact with Japanese 
institutions. While this is true of Japanese who marry 
foreigners, themselves, more importantly, this is also 






who marry foreigners. The in-laws of the Japanese 
people that marry foreigners are coming into contact 
with a form of foreign difference on a much greater 
and more conspicuous scale than ever before. This is 
happening in ways that are destabilizing stereotypes 
about foreign difference and are leading to new 
ways that foreigners and Japanese are positioned 
within society relative to each other (Burgess 2008; 
Capobianco 2017). 
 As more Japanese families are exposed to 
foreigners via the spouses of their children, siblings, 
grandchildren, nieces and nephews, cousins , 
etc., there is a greater chance that more earnest 
connections will be established between foreigners 
and Japanese personally and emotionally. Considering 
the intimate nature of family life, these relationships 
can help establish a foundation upon which more 
amicable relations and conceptualizations can 
develop. In other words, more Japanese marrying 
foreigners will likely raise the overall consciousness 
of the existence of foreigners in Japan, as well as help 
develop a more nuanced understanding of what their 
lives in Japan entail. Foreigners will no longer be 
conceptual anomalies simply existing in Japan in the 
abstract but will become a reality as more Japanese 
learn about foreigners through their close relatives.
 Furthermore, the biracial offspring resulting from 
these kokusai kekkon are being raised in Japan and 
are culturally and linguistically Japanese. Depending 
on the ancestry of the non-Japanese parent, they 
may or may not be able to “pass” as Japanese 
phenotypically, though they can culturally.
 This fact is also significant in that Japanese 
pupils are being taught at school alongside pupils 
who have non-Japanese parents. This leads to an 
increased degree of consciousness of mixed people 
in Japan, which can engender both positive and 
negative outcomes contingent on the context and 
content of such interactions. Positively, if people 
form relationships with mixed and foreign students, 
the consciousness of issues related to foreigners 
and diversity will correspondingly increase. Mixed 
students have the best chance at achieving this 
but so do non-mixed foreign pupils, who are also 
increasingly common. However, it is not implausible 
to assume that mixed students with a Japanese 
parent will fare better at this.
 Negative sentiments can also develop, which can 
strain relations between Japanese and mixed persons. 
Consider, for example, data from Yoko Yamamoto, 
who discusses the case of a biracial half-American, 
half-Japanese girl who experienced bullying by her 
classmates. Prior to this experience, this student was 
unaware that she was “a foreigner”: “…Suddenly, 
a boy bumped into me on purpose and said ‘gaijin ’ 
(foreigner)! I was confused because I thought that 
I was Japanese” (Yamamoto 2013, 55). Thus, not all 
encounters end positively.
 A Japanese interlocutor from the Kanto region 
confided to me that he also had mixed and foreign 
classmates while attending school. However, he 
also explained that he found it easier to get along 
with western students rather than Southeast Asian 
students. He notes: 
 It was always easier to get along 
with someone if the father was like from 
America or France. Even those kids who 
were white but raised in Japan were easy 
to become friendly with. But the students 
whose parents were from the Philippines 
or Nepal or something, they were always 
more difficult. One of my best friends even 
had a fight with a Vietnamese student in 
high school. I was so shocked!
 These anecdotes, in addition to Yamamoto’s 
findings, show that Japanese people are becoming 
increasingly conscious of the diversity extant in 
Japan and are developing critical opinions of it. 
 Unsurprisingly, the increased commonality of 
biracial offspring has produced a number of athletes 
and celebrities of mixed background and this is 
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before experienced. Over the past decade, there 
has been a significant proliferation of the number 
of biracial people that have come into the national 
spotlight. The impacts of these people and their 
increased visibility within Japan has generated 
discussions concerning what it means to “be 
Japanese,” as well as how biracial people fit into ideas 
and discourses about national belonging. 
 The most public and most controversial of these 
has been Ariana Miyamoto. Miyamoto was born to an 
African-American father and Japanese mother and 
gained national attention when she was named Miss 
Universe Japan in 2015. She was the first biracial 
person to win the award, which caused controversy 
and generated debates about whether or not she was 
“Japanese enough” to win. Some voices, mostly from 
the conservative right, questioned to what extent 
someone with mixed ancestry should have won the 
award. Miyamoto later responded that throughout 
her life, non-mixed Japanese have, despite her 
cultural and linguistic fluency, told her there was no 
way that she could be Japanese because she did not 
look Japanese (Wingfield-Hayes 2015). 
 Miyamoto explains that, rather than considering 
herself to be “Japanese,” the term ha-fu  more 
accurately depicts her identity and how she identifies 
herself. Ha-fu  is a term that denotes a person 
of mixed-Japanese ancestry and carries with it 
sociocultural connotations. Interestingly, Priyanka 
Yoshikawa, another ha-fu , born to a Bengali Indian 
father and a Japanese mother, won the contest the 
following year. Yoshikawa was granted the award 
despite the fallout from Miyamoto’s victory, thus 
leading one to critically question the efficacy of 
the discriminatory discourses that surfaced after 
Miyamoto’s victory.
 Miyamoto’s victory generated critical discussions 
about whom may or may not be considered Japanese. 
While this discussion has been ongoing for some time, 
Miyamoto’s case is unique in several ways. First, 
her mixed background is prominently featured in 
her appearance; whereas in the past, many mixed 
Japanese could phenotypically “pass” as Japanese, 
this is not the case with Miyamoto. This would 
suggest she is an outsider and not Japanese, despite 
her native cultural competency and linguistic fluency, 
which throws into flux ideas that have historically 
associated Japanese identity with a particular 
physical appearance (Lie 2001; Yoshino 1992). Second, 
her rise to fame as a model and the winner of Miss 
Universe Japan, which allowed her to represent 
Japan in the Miss Universe competition, adds a layer 
of complexity that thrusts national identity into 
the picture. The fact that she was awarded a prize 
that would allow her to represent Japan means that 
people need to consider her positionality as a mixed-
Japanese person, for better or for worse. While some 
have said that she should rightfully be considered as 
Japanese and be eligible to represent Japan, others 
remain adamant that she is not Japanese and a “pure” 
(i.e. non-mixed) Japanese person should have been 
chosen. There is, thus, little agreement at the level 
of national discourse to determine who is and who is 
not Japanese. How this debate ultimately unfolds will 
have serious implications for the future of Japan as 
it relates to the incorporation of foreign and mixed 
people. 
 Another celebrity that has gained notoriety is 
Asuka Cambridge, who was born to a Japanese 
mother and Jamaican father. In 2016, he represented 
Japan as part of the track and field team at the 
Summer Olympics Games in Rio de Janeiro . 
Cambridge and the Japanese team placed second in 
the 4x100 meter Relay, in which they were beaten 
only by a Usain Bolt-led Jamaica team. The team’s 
success in the Olympics gained them national acclaim 
within Japan. Later in 2016, Cambridge appeared on 
Japan’s annual twenty-four-hour telethon for charity 
holding two track cleats, one portraying the Jamaican 
flag and the other portraying the Japanese flag. 
Cambridge explained that these cleats represent his 
dual heritage. The fact that Cambridge could appear 
on national television with both cleats and adamantly 
profess his dual identity shows that, like Miyamoto, 
he is more willing to assert a dual identity publicly. 






track star, Abdul Hakim Sani Brown, joined 
Cambridge on the Japanese national track team at 
the 2019 World Athletics Championships held in 
Doha. Brown was part of a Japanese team that won 
a bronze medal in the 4x100 meter relay. He was 
supposed to join Cambridge on the 2016 team but 
was held back due to a hamstring injury (Nagatsuka 
2016). Both Cambridge and Brown have received 
public attention for their positive representation of 
the Japanese national team.    
 Lastly, it is worth mentioning the even more 
curious case of Naomi Osaka, who is presented much 
more ambiguously than the others. Osaka, born to 
a Japanese mother and Haitian father, was raised in 
the United States and eschews questions relating 
to her identity as Japanese. When she defeated 
tennis star Serena Williams at the U.S. Open in 
2018, mixed discourses surrounded her victory. 
While sentiments similar to those directed towards 
Miyamoto abounded, some of these actually made 
sense, since she was not culturally Japanese and her 
linguistic fluency in Japanese seems non-existent. 
However, other discourses emerged suggesting that 
she was Japanese because of her behavior. While 
Williams behaved in a rowdy fashion throughout 
the match, Osaka remained calm and composed, as 
she always appears to be. Calmness and composure 
were deemed by some observers as “truly Japanese” 
traits, which led to some people acknowledging and 
appreciating her Japanese behavior and identifying 
her as Japanese because of this. Especially curious is 
the fact that unlike Cambridge, Miyamoto, or Brown, 
Osaka seldom is seen speaking Japanese and her 
knowledge of the language remains ambiguous. While 
support for Cambridge might be understood, given 
his obvious fluency in the Japanese language and 
cultural norms, the same cannot be said of Osaka. 
 The presence of these biracial celebrities is 
having diverse impacts on Japanese discourses 
about foreign difference at an unprecedented scale. 
How they develop and to what extent they actually 
affect attitudes about foreigners in Japan remains 
to be seen. However, the presence of people like 
those mentioned above—as well as other celebrities 
and athletes, such as Becky, Rora, Yu Darvish, Rui 
Hachimura, and Aaron Wolf—will undoubtedly affect 
attitudes towards foreigners in diverse ways, which 
researchers must attend to moving forward. 
 Historically, there has been little room for 
articulations of dual identities within Japan. However, 
this may change if more people like Cambridge and 
Miyamoto assert a dual identity and use words like 
ha-fu  to describe themselves while also remaining 
grounded in a contemporary Japanese milieu. Unlike 
in the past, when the children of foreigners and 
minority groups were unlikely to adamantly assert 
a strong second or mixed identity, these examples 
show that at least some second-generation mixed 
people today are more willing to do so. Rather than 
making efforts to “pass” as Japanese, these second-
generation mixed-Japanese are now making claims 
to a different identity, which has had limited success 
in destabilizing social ideologies in previous cases 
(Chapman 2007). This may be due in part to the 
fact that it is harder to “pass” as Japanese based 
on any appearance of many mixed people. While 
terms such as Italian American or British Pakistani 
are common ways people identify themselves with 
multiple cultures, the phenomenon of having an 
ethnic identity different from a national identity 
has been the topic of much consideration in Japan. 
Therefore, whether or not people like Cambridge 
and Miyamoto will be accepted into the mainstream 
remains uncertain. The fact that such matters are 
being raised marks a turning point in which Japan 
will be forced to reconcile these tensions. How this 
will happen remains uncertain and could result in 
either further acceptance of mixed people or further 
marginalization. Nonetheless, as Japan diversifies, 
there will be a greater likelihood that more critical 
discussions about these topics will develop.
 These novel conditions are putting Japanese 
into contact with foreigners in new ways, which 
are fundamentally different from those of the past. 
Previously, it was easy to relegate foreigners to 
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this is no longer true as an increasing number of 
Japanese engage with foreigners on a regular basis 
and are coming to know them more intimately. As 
these encounters unfold, there is a greater likelihood 
that different types of relationships will emerge in 
ways that lead Japanese to reconceptualize the role 
of foreigners in Japan, the results of which may be 
both positive and negative (Burgess 2008; Capobianco 
2017; Faier 2009; Green and Kadoya 2015). While 
the outcomes of these interactions have yet to be 
seen, there is little doubt that they affect Japan and 
how the majority understands the experience and 
positionality of foreigners. It is important to recognize 
that these encounters engender both positive and 
negative sentiments, as not all encounters with, and 
exposure to, foreigners lead to positive outcomes that 
improve cross-cultural understanding. Nonetheless, 
the forces of change are in motion, which demands 
further consideration as to how the newfound 
effects of migration to Japan create new contexts, 
experiences, and ideas from within Japan.
Ⅳ  D i s c u s s i o n
 The underlying premise of this article is that the 
conditions surrounding migration and diversity in 
Japan today are making foreigners and mixed people 
more visible in Japanese society. This is happening 
through a variety of channels, each of which has its 
own particularities. While there are many reasons 
why foreigners have remained invisible for so long, 
arguably the most important factor enabling this 
invisibility is lack of knowledge. A lack of firsthand 
experience, ignorance, and failure by media outlets 
to capture this breadth lay at the core of the ability 
to downplay the presence of foreigners for so long. 
Lie also notes, that “In spite of concerted efforts by 
some scholars and activists to challenge the belief 
in Japanese ethnic homogeneity, the view that only 
Japanese live in Japan is deeply rooted and widely 
shared” (Lie 2000, 80) and that “when asked about 
Japan’s existing minorities, many people seemed 
puzzled and confused” (Lie 2000, 80). Thus, ignorance 
and misinformation converge with existing identity 
ideologies to create conditions that have facilitated 
this invisibility. 
 Although slow, processes of change are unfolding 
and are carrying important ramifications for the 
trajectory of Japan and the ways that Japanese 
conceptualize the foreign presence in Japan. If more 
amicable relations continue to develop, there will 
likely be more serious calls to recognize the presence 
of foreigners in Japan, thus engendering further 
critical discussions. This will compel a multitude of 
effects, both positive and negative. It is hard not to 
imagine such discussions compelling more critical 
inquiries into how foreigners are positioned in Japan, 
what role they have to play in Japan’s future, and 
the ways Japan should change to accommodate 
foreigners and biracial people. It is also not hard to 
imagine these changes compelling a new wave of 
racism and xenophobia and leading some to develop 
more hostile attitudes towards foreigners. While it 
is too early to say how these changes will develop, 
we can recognize that changes happening and how 
they progress will have serious implications for life in 
Japan.
 Another effect of these changes is that they will 
likely make people more accustomed to the cultural 
impacts of Japan’s diversification. As Japanese come 
in contact with foreigners and biracial people in new 
contexts, such interactions will become normalized, as 
will the general presence of foreigners within Japan. 
Minimally, this will suggest that people will not 
stare at foreigners or be caught off guard when they 
need to interact with a foreigner. However, more 
seriously, this also means that people who are raised 
in an environment in which diversity is the norm will 
likely possess a heightened cross-cultural sensitivity 
to issues related to foreigners. Such people are likely 
to be more sympathetic to the problems foreigners 
and mixed people face, as well as be more willing 
to accept them as members of Japanese society. 
Since ignorance of foreigners and Others has been a 






corresponding invisibility, it is plausible to assume 
that as more people become aware of the presence 
of foreigners, this too will change. This creates a 
heightened awareness of diversity and cultural 
difference, which will likely manifest in the ways 
Japanese and foreigners interact with each other. 
 Although it is unlikely that negative attitudes 
towards foreigners will vanish completely, as the 
aforementioned encounters persist attitudes towards 
diversity and cultural differences will likely improve 
(much like in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere). The 
generational differences between people raised in 
a time when there was little diversity, compared 
with those who grew up with much higher levels of 
diversity, will likely hold very different—likely more 
neutral views of diversity. While new issues will 
arise, it is hard to seriously envision a future in which 
attitudes towards diversity, and foreigners in general, 
mirror those of previous generations.
 Lastly, the presence of foreigners and biracial 
people have already led to more critical discussions 
about Japanese identity and foreignness. Stephen 
Murphy-Shigematsu notes that “mult iethnic 
individuals cannot easily be dismissed as foreigners” 
and thus have the potential to lead to conceptual 
identity reconfigurations (2000, 212). This has 
been a major issue surrounding mixed celebrities 
like Miyamoto and Cambridge, whose presence 
destabilizes existing paradigms about who is and 
who is not perceived to be Japanese. Mixed people 
challenge the status quo in ways that foreigners 
themselves cannot. Namely, biracial people born and 
raised in Japan possess the linguistic and cultural 
capital to pass themselves as Japanese. They also 
share Japanese ancestry (or “blood”), which has 
been historically important in constructing Japanese 
identity (Robertson 2008; Yoshino 1992) . The 
consciousness of such people has led more Japanese 
to reconsider their role in Japanese society and 
Japan’s future more generally. 
 People such as the celebrit ies mentioned 
above currently still exist as cultural anomalies. 
Japanese discourses have not yet figured out how 
to logically reconcile their existence and Japanese 
discourses often position such people conceptually in 
idiosyncratic ways. Despite enhanced media attention, 
serious discussion remains limited and will only 
expand in the future. As this occurs, we can expect 
discourses about who is and who is not perceptibly 
Japanese to take on new directions. We cannot yet 
predict exactly how this will proceed, but the points 
raised in this paper offer some potential directions. 
 There are two extremes as to how this may 
occur. The first of these is radical acceptance in 
which activists, Japanese citizens, and politicians 
make headway in the ongoing fight for foreign and 
minority rights and recognition. This would lead to a 
greater accommodation of foreigners, serious efforts 
to develop Japan as a truly multicultural society, 
and one in which diversity is encouraged rather 
than made invisible. At the other extreme is radical 
rejection in which far-right groups with xenophobic 
and nationalistic motivates strengthen and in which 
support services available to foreigners do not 
develop as needed. Extreme rejection would produce 
stronger anti-foreigner sentiments and may lead 
to some form of conflict—making foreigners more 
visible in a different way. 
 The most likely path, however, is somewhere in 
the middle. While foreigners may not be entirely 
accepted, it is also unlikely that intense racism will 
prevail. There will be too many positive encounters 
taking place and too intimate relationships developing 
to allow for the xenophobic attitudes to win out. 
Nonetheless, the struggle to recognize foreign 
difference and make the foreign presence in Japan 
more tangible faces an uphill battle with much 
progress to be made. How this unfolds remains 
a serious question that will impact the trajectory 
of Japan for future decades. We can merely draw 
upon the data, anecdotes, and inferences we have to 
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Ⅴ C o n c l u s i o n
 This paper has provided two examples of how 
migration in Japan today is different than in the 
past. The two ways that have been discussed—
the increasing and diversifying presence of foreign 
communities and the growth of mixed families and 
children—are just two of many different ways that 
migration into Japan today is qualitatively and 
quantitatively different than previously experienced. 
These particularities make the foreign presence 
in Japan more visible, which carries important 
implications for how Japan understands and engages 
with foreign difference. The novel context in which 
these interactions are happening is creating new 
types of encounters and relationships between 
Japanese and foreigners, which facilitate new forms 
of sociality and more critical discussions about the 
construction and trajectory of Japanese identity. 
Considering these particularities, further investigation 
is warranted to obtain a more nuanced understanding 
of their true effects on Japanese society. 
References 
Amano, Kanako.
 2017 “Nihon kokunai ni okeru “Kokusai kekkon 
kono 20 nen no suii”, mikonka shakai de-
ta kousatsu ‘sono saki ni aru unmei no 
hito’” [20 years of transition—International 
marriages in Japan —An inquiry into the 
data on unmarried society—A person 
waiting for you in the future]. Accessed 
May 29, 2019. https://www.nli-research.
co.jp/report/detail/id=56881?site=nli.
Bélanger Danièle, Kayoko Ueno, 
Khuat Thu Hong, and Emiko Ochiai
 2011   “From Foreign Trainees to Unauthorized 
Workers: Vietnamese Migrant Workers 
in Japan.” Asia and Pacific Migration 
J ourna l  2 0 ( 1 ) :  3 1–53 .  h t tp s : / /do i .
org/10.1177/011719681102000102
Burgess, Christopher
 2008  “ ( R e ) C o n s t r u c t i n g  B o u n d a r i e s : 
International Marriage Migrants in 
Yamagata as Agents of Multiculturalism.” 
In Mult icultural ism in New Japan: 
Crossing the Boundaries Within, edited by 
Nelson H. Graburn, John Ertl, and R. Kenji 
Tierney, 64–81. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
Bushnell, Cade
 2013 “A Report on an Investigation of Global 
30 Students’ Japanese Learning Needs.” 
Tsukuba daigaku ryuugakusei senta 
Nihon kyōiku ronshuu 28: 383–408.
 
Capobianco, Paul 
 2017  “ T r a n s f i g u r i n g  I d e n t i t y :  S o c i a l 
R e l a t i o n s h i p s  a n d  I n t e r c u l t u r a l 
Commun i ca t i on  be tween  Fore ign 
“Chi ldren” and Japanese ‘Parents .” 
Journal of International and Intercultural 
Communication 10(4): 324–341. https://doi.
org/10.1080/17513057.2017.1300311
Chapman, David
 2007   “The Third Way and Beyond: Zainichi 
Korean Identity and the Politics of 
Belonging.” Japanese Studies 24(1): 29–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1037139041000168
4697
Douglas, Michael and Glenda S. Roberts, eds
 2000 Japan and Global Migration: Foreign 
W o r k e r s  a n d  t h e  A d v e n t  o f  a 
Multicultural Society. Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press. 
Faier, Leiba
 2009  Intimate Encounters: Filipina Women and 
the Remaking of Rural Japan. Berkeley : 
University of California Press. 
Friman, H. Richard
 2001　 “Informal  Economies ,  Immigrat ion 
Entrepreneurship and Drug Crime in 
Japan.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration 








Green, David and Yoshihiko Kadoya
 2015　 “Contact and Threat: Factors Affecting 
Views on Increasing Immigration in 
Japan.” Politics & Policy 43(1): 59–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12109
Japanese Cabinet Office
 2019  “Kokuseki, chiiki betsu zairyy shikaku 
(zairyuu mokuteki) betsu: Sōzairyuu 
gaikokujin.” [Resident foreigners in Japan 
based on location and area (and reason for 
being in Japan): Total statistics.] Accessed 






 2003  “Resettlement and Border Crossing: 
A Comparative Study of the Life and 
Ethnicity of Vietnamese in Australia and 
Japan.” International Journal of Japanese 
Sociology 12: 48-67. 
Lie, John
 2000  “The discourse of Japaneseness.” In Japan 
and Global Migration: Foreign Workers 
and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, 
edited by Michael Douglas and Glenda S. 
Roberts, 69–88. Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press.
 2001   Multiethnic Japan. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
 2008a  “ I nv i s i b i l i t y  and  Cohab i t a t i on  i n 
Multiethnic Tokyo.” In The Other Global 
City, edited by Shail Mayaram, 161–178. 
London: Routledge.
 2008b  Zainichi (Koreans in Japan): Diasporic 
Nationalism and Postcolonial Identity. 
Berkeley: University of California Press
Migration Policy Institute
 2017   “As its Population Ages, Japan Quietly 





 2018   “Abe’s Choice for Japan:  Thriving 
Migra t i on  Wi thout  Immigra t i on . ” 
Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs 4(1): 
20–28.
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
 2017   “Population Statistics of Japan 2017.” 
Accessed May 30, 2019. http://www.ipss.
go.jp/p-info/e/psj2017/PSJ2017-06.xls. 
Morita, Toyoko
 2003   “Iranian Immigrant Workers in Japan and 
Their Networks.” In Global Japan: The 
Experience of Japan’s New Immigrant 
and Overseas Communities, edited by 
Roger Goodman, Ceri Peach, Ayumi 
Takenaka, and Paul White, 159–164. 
London: Routledge.
Morris-Suzuki, Tessa
 1998   Reinventing Japan: Nation, Culture, 
Identity.  New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Murphy-Shigematsu, Stephen
 2000 “Identities of Multiethnic People in 
Japan.” In Japan and Global Migration: 
Foreign Workers and the Advent of a 
Multicultural Society, edited by Michael 
Douglas and Glenda S. Roberts, 196–216. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Nagatsuka, Kaz
 2016 “Star Sprinter Sani Brown Decides to 
Attend University of Florida.” The Japan 






 2008 “Biopower: Blood, Kinship, and Eugenic 
Marriage.” In A Companion to the 
Anthropology of Japan, edited by Jennifer 
Robertson, 329–354.  Malden: Wiley 
Blackwell.
Roth, Joshua Hotaka
 2002 Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian 
Migrants in Japan.  Ithaca :  Cornel l 
University Press.
Ryang, Sonia, ed.





















nnual Papers of the A
nthropological Institute V
ol.11 (2020)
Margin. London: Routledge. 
Shipper, Appichai W.
 2008 Fighting for Foreigners: Immigration 
and Its Impact on Japanese Democracy. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Sakurai, Keiko
 2003 Nihon no Musurimu shakai  [Japan’s 
Muslim Societies]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō.
Świtek, Beata
 2016 Reluctant Intimacies: Japanese Eldercare 
in Indonesian Hands. New York: Berghahn 
Books.
Tsuda, Takeyuki Gaku
 2003 Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland: 
Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in 
Transnational Perspective. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Weiner, Michael
 1998 “Oppos ing Vis ions :  Migrat ion and 
Citizenship Policies in Japan and the 
United States.” In Temporary Workers 
or Future Citizens?: Japanese and U.S. 
Migration Policies, edited by Michael 
Weiner and Tadashi Hanami, 3–28. 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Willis, David Blake and Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu
 2008 “Transcultural Japan: Metamorphosis in 
the cultural borderlands and beyond.” In 
Transcultural Japan: At the Borderlands 
of Race, Gender, and Identity, edited by 
David Blake Willis and Stephen Murphy-
Shigematsu, 3–44. London: Routledge.
Wingfield-Hayes, Rupert
 2015  “The Beauty Contest Winner Making 
Japan Look at  Utse l f ”  BBC News . 
Accessed December 1, 2018. https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-32957610.  
Yamamoto, Yoko
 2013 “Immigrant Children’s Schooling and 
Family Processes in Japan: Trends, 
Challenges, and Implications.” In Global 
Perspectives on Well-Being in Immigrant 
Families,  edited by Radosveta Dimitrova, 
Michael Bender, and Fons van de Vijver, 
55–74. New York: Springer, 55-74.
Yamanaka, Keiko
 1996 “Return Migration of Japanese-Brazilians 
to Japan: The Nikkeijin as Ethnic Minority 
and Political Construct.” Diaspora: A 
Journal of Transnational Studies 5(1): 65-
96.
Yoshino, Kosaku
 1992 Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary 
Japan: A Sociological Enquiry. London: 
Routledge.
15
Japanese M
igration T
hen and N
ow
